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INTRODUCTION 
After initially being arrested in the early morning hours of July 28,2007, for being 
in a park after hours in violation of the Boise Municipal Code, appellant Stephen Donald 
Newman was charged and convicted by jury of the crime of attempted rape. Evidence of 
Newman's conduct at the time of his arrest could not have justified his conviction. When 
encountered by Boise police officers, Newman was sitting in his vehicle alone; there was 
no potential victim of a sexual assault in the area. 
Following Newman's arrest, at a time when he was handcuffed and sitting some 
distance from his vehicle, the arresting officers conducted a warrantless search of his 
vehicle. That search incident to the arrest for the after-hours violation resulted in the 
seizure of extensive materials which led prosecuting authorities to conclude that Newman 
had formed a plan to lure a woman to the park with the intent to rape her. After the 
District Court denied a pretrial motion to suppress all evidentiary fruits of the warrantless 
vehicle search, that evidence formed the indispensable core of the state's case at trial. 
In the briefing on the defense motion to suppress, appellant's counsel cited a 
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court, State v. Gant, which clearly supported appellant's 
position on the illegality of the warrantless vehicle search. Appellant also noted that the 
United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Gant for the purpose of revisiting 
the issue of the circumstances under which searches of vehicles incident to arrest are 
constitutionally permissible. That left the District Court in the unenviable position of 
having to predict the outcome of a high court ruling that would not be issued until after 
decision of Newmau's motion to suppress. If the high court reversed the Arizona 
Supreme Court and upheld the legality of the search in Gant, then a similar result should 
have obtained here. But if the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the 
Arizona Supreme Court in Gant, its opinion would dictate suppression of the seized 
evidence in this case. 
The District Court denied appellant's motion to suppress, approving the 
evidentiary seizure in this case as the product of a permissible search incident to arrest. 
Subsequently, in Arizona v. Gant,, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the United States Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional the vehicle search in that case. 
Arizona v. Gant controls the single claim raised by this appeal. This Court should 
rule that the search of appellant's vehicle was unconstitutionally conducted, reverse 
appellant's conviction, and remand to the District Court for further proceedings consistent 
with its decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant Stephen Donald Newman was charged on August 11,2007 by complaint 
with a single count of attempted rape in violation of Idaho Code 5 18-6101,306. (R p. 11)' 
A grand jury indictment followed on August 21St. (R p.17) 
' The Clerk's Transcript in this case consists of only one volume, and is unlined. 
For that reason, volume and line references to the Clerk's Transcript are omitted. 
On February 7,2008, Newman filed a motion challenging the legality of a 
warrantless search of his vehicle following his arrest that resulted in the discovery of 
virtually all of the prosecution evidence in the case. (R p.39) After a March 14,2008, 
hearing on the motion, the District Court denied the motion. (R p.54) 
Following further motions and related hearings that are not the focus of this 
appeal, Newman was tried by a jury beginning July 11,2008. (R p.123) The jury returned 
a guilty verdict on July 16,2008. (R p.145) 
On November 19,2008, the District Court sentenced appellant Newman to a total 
sentence of 15 years in prison - 7 and a half years to be fixed, and the remaining 7 and a 
half years to be indeterminate. (TR Vol. 1, p. 799, L. 3-8) 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. Facts Relating to Newman's Arrest and the Search of His Vehicle 
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, officers testified about the circumstances 
leading to Newman's arrest and the search of his car. (TR Vol. March 14,2008) Officers 
described the same circumstances at trial. The description below is taken from both 
proceedings. As will appear, none of the relevant facts are in dispute. 
On July 27,2007, Boise resident Gretchan Heller responded to an ad for an iPod in 
the "free" section of Craigslist. (TR Vol. 1, p. 262, L. 2) A reply at around 3 p.m that day 
from a person calling himself Terry explained that the iPod was his wife's, that she had 
cheated on him, and that it was therefore his right to give it away. (TR Vol. 1, p. 264, L. 
20) At about 10 p.m., Heller received another message from Terry stating that if she was 
still interested in the free iPod, he would send directions to its location. (TR Vol. 1, p. 
266, L. 25 ) In that follow-up message, Heller was told to go to a park at Eagle and 
McMillan. (TR Vol.1, p. 268, L. 1) There she would find a Porta Potty; the iPod would be 
inside the Porta Potty, on top of a towel holder. (TR Vol.1 p. 268, L. 5) 
Heller believed something suspicious was going on. (TR Vol. 1, p. 268, L. 21) She 
and her husband traveled to the area of the park to see if there was a vehicle waiting. (TR 
Vol. 1, p. 269, L. 3-14) She saw a car in the park. (TR Vol. 1, p. 277, L. 3 ) At that point 
Heller and her husband went to an Albertson's parking lot near the park, and called the 
police. (TR Vol. 1, p. 275, L. 3) 
Boise Officer Cory Bammert reported to the Albertson's lot at 11:52 p.m. (TR Vol. 
1, p. 304, L. 1-4) A backup unit of Officers Abercrombie and Coltrin arrived soon 
thereafter. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 6, L. 25) After hearing from Heller, Bammert and 
the backup officers went into the park and observed a maroon SUV with its lights off. 
(TR Vol. 1,  p. 306, L.8) Bammert checked inside a nearby Porta Potty but found no iPod. 
(TR Vol. 1, p. 306, L. 12-14) 
Bammert then did a passenger side approach to the SUV. (TR Vol. March 14, 
2008, p. 9, L. 24) The SUV had tinted windows and Bammert did not believe it was 
occupied. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 11, L. 17) Bammert knocked on the window. (TR 
Vol. March 14,2008, p. 12, L. 8) The driver, later identified as Stephen Newman, rolled 
down the window. (Vol March 14,2008, p. 12, L. 22) Newman reported that he had been 
parked for an hour and a half working on his computer. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13, 
L. 1) Although it was a hot night, Newman was wearing a knit cap. (TR Vol. 1, p. 308, L. 
13-17) Bammert saw a pair of ski gloves in the passenger seat. Newman said the gloves 
had been there a while. (TR Vol. 1, p. 308, L. 23; TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 6) 
After a short conversation, Bammert told Newman to step out of the car in order to 
place him under arrest for being in the park after hours, in violation of Boise Municipal 
Code $ 3  13-03-05 to 13-03-10. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 15; TR Vol. 1, p. 331, L. 16; TR 
Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 11) Newman was ordered out of the car and placed under 
arrest solely for that offense. (TR Vol. March 14,2008 p. 62, L. 7) Bammert testified that 
Newman was under arrest from the time he left his car. (TR Vol. 1, p. 331, L. 25) At that 
point Abercroinbie was at the rear of the car and Coltrin was on the driver's side. (Vol 
March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 15) 
On his way to meet Newman by the driver's door, Bammert met Officer 
Abercrombie at the rear of the SUV; Abercrombie said Newman was sticking something 
behind the seat.. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 20) Bammert then observed that 
Newman was placing something between the seats with his right hand, although he did 
no1 testify that he identified the item. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 13, L. 22) When he 
reached Newman on the driver's side, Bammert asked him what he had placed between 
the seats. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 14, L. 19) Newman did not say at first. (TR Vol. 
March 14,2008, p. 14, L. 22)2 
Newmm exited the car. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 14) Bammert handcuffed him and 
sat him on the curb. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 15; TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 33, L. 25) 
Having secured Newman away from his vehicle on a charge of violating the Boise code 
provision, and not before, the officers searched the vehicle incident to that arrest. (TR 
Vol. March 14,2008, p. 34, L. 3 et seq. ) 
B. The Fruits of the Search Incident 
For all practical purposes, the prosecution's attempted rape case against Newman 
was comprised of evidence seized by police during the search incident. Having placed 
Newman under arrest, handcuffed him, md secured him in a location away from the 
SUV, the officers entered the SUV. 
The officers found a kitchen knife under the ski gloves that were located in the 
front passenger seat. (TR Vol. March 14,2008 p. 34, L. 25) Bammert admitted that he did 
not see the knife until the search incident to arrest. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 35, L. 6) 
Officers seized a pellet gun located behind the driver's seat. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 
The officers testified that the pellet gun was discovered as part of the search 
incident to arrest, and not before. (TR VoI. March 14,2008, p. 66, L. 23) As Newman 
was being handcuffed he told the officers he had dropped a pellet gun behind his seat. 
(TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 67, L. 3) Abercrombie testified that at about the same time 
he observed a part of the pellet gun through the window. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 67, 
L. 11) He later testified that the gun was located during the search incident. (TR Vol. 
March 14,2008, p. 70, L. 22) 
70, L. 5 et ~ e q . ) ~  The pellet gun was not loaded. (TR Vol. 1, p. 334, L. 9) The officers 
discovered that the back seat of the SUV was down. (TR Vol. March 14,2008, p. 15, L. 
21) They found a men's belt in the back of the car. 
The officers found and seized a laptop computer which Newman was working on 
when he was arrested. (TR Vol. 1, p. 309, L. 22) The laptop contained numerous 
electronic files which the prosecution introduced into evidence at trial to tie Newmau to 
the free iPod ad, and to support its claim that Newman intended to commit rape on July 
27,2007. 
C. The Trial Evidence 
The jury saw two movies (Exhibits 16 and 17) downloaded from the seized 
computer depicting Newman and a woman engaged in sex acts on what appeared to be 
two separate occasions. During the defense case, the woman depicted in the video as 
Ruby testified that her participation in the roleplaying was entirely consensual. (TR Vol. 
1, pp. 591-597) In the video, Newman and Ruby roleplay long rape scenes. Newman is 
seen and heard berating, beating, and (seemingly) forcibly penetrating Ruby. In addition 
to the sexual acts, Newman threatens Ruby with a knife. 
In e-mails between Newman and the woman he calls Ruby (Exhibits 20-28), 
Newman told Ruby that he would love to rape her and asked how rough he could get with 
Having discovered the gun during the search incident, Bammert added a charge 
of carrying a concealed weapon to the arrest. B m e r t  was clear, however, that at no 
point on the night of Newman's arrest was he charged with attempted rape. 
her. In another, Newman described a fantasy in which he rapes a college student whose 
car has broken down. 
A detective described commercially produced videos that were located on 
Newman's laptop, although the movies were not played in the courtroom. The jury heard 
about a video in which a woman walks into a bike repair shop and two men sexually 
assault her in various ways. That video had an identifier at the bottom of the screen: 
www.rapeserver.com. (TR Vol. 1, p. 362, L. 22 et seq.) 
The jury also heard about various e-mails Newman apparently sent from his laptop 
and Internet searches Newman conducted during the twenty-four hours before his arrest. 
(TR Vol. 1, p. 378, L. 21 et seq.) The prosecution offered Exhibit 18, which was a time 
line of activity on Newman's computer during that period. The prosecution contended 
without challenge from the defense that Newman was responsible for all of the activity. 
in the early hours of July 27,2007, "Sara" answered from Newman's computer a 
Craigslist ad for someone looking for a female roommate. (TR Vol. 1, p. 380, L. 17) In 
the e-mail, Sara asked whether she could come see the apartment. (TR Vol. 1, p. 380, L. 
21) Sara sent an e-mail to another woman looking for a roommate. (TR Vol. 1, p. 381, L. 
13) Later Sara inquired about a prom dress that was listed for sale. (TR Vol. 1, p. 383, L. 
7) Next Sara sent a message asking whether a wedding dress that had been listed was still 
available. (TR Vol. 1, p. 383, L. 18) Sara sent another message regarding yet another 
wedding dress a short time later. (TR Vol. 1, p. 384, L. 4) 
A few hours later, shortly before 9 a.m. on July 27th, Newman checked responses 
to an ad he had posted regarding free therapy. (TR Vol. 1, p. 384, L. 18) Newman then 
sent another message checking on the availability of one of the wedding dresses. (TR Vol. 
1, p. 385, L. 17) Newman then accessed one of the videos on the laptop. (TR Vol. 1, p. 
385, L. 20) At around 9:30 a.m., Craigslist sent Newman a message confirming that his 
iPod listing had been posted. (TR Vol. 1, p. 387, L. 2) In some of the correspondence 
relating to the iPod, Newman used an email address at "anonymousspeech.com" which 
would make it difficult for the government to locate the person attached to the address. 
(TR Vol. 1, p. 517, L. 15) 
A person named Amanda responded to the iPod ad and shortly thereafter Newman 
conducted a search on Myspace for the e-mail address amansell1181 @yahoo.com. (TR 
Vol. 1, p. 387, L. 22) Gretchan responded to the iPod ad at about 3:30 p.m. (TR Vol. 1, p. 
394, L. 6) Newman also conducted a search for the name "Carly Bovee" which was the 
name of one of the people selling a wedding dress. (TR Vol. 1, p. 388, L. 11) Later in the 
day Newman checked Amanda's Yahoo.com profile. (TR Vol. 1, p. 390, L. 13) 
Amanda e-mailed at 4:48 to ask whether she could pick up the free iPod. (TR Vol. 
1, p. 391, L. 12) Newman conducted other people searches between 5:48 and 6:19 p.m. 
on July 27". (TR Vol. 1, p. 391, L. 15) At 6.19 p.m. he searched for an address: 4654 
Newberg in Boise. (TR Vol. 1, p. 391, L. 21) 
Newman sent an e-mail to Gretchan at 10:03 p.m. in which he says "I know it's 
late, I'll wait 15 minutes." (TR Vol. 1, p. 393, L. 6) He sent a similar message to Amanda 
a short time later. (TR Vol. 1, p. 393, L. 24) At 10:06 p.m. Newman sent Gretchan a 
message saying no one has claimed the iPod. (TR Vol. 1, p. 394, L. 16) Gretchan wrote 
back to say that she would love to have it. (TR Vol 1, p. 394, L.18) Newman then 
conducted searches to try to identify Gretchan. (TR Vol. 1, p. 395, L. 7) He found 
pictures of her on Myspace. (TR Vol. 1, p. 399, L. 5) He eventually sent her the e-mail, 
ultimately provided by Gretchan to the police, which gave her directions to the park and 
told her where she could find the iPod. 
Police also identified various Google searches conducted on Newman's computer 
in the days before his arrest (Exhibits 29 and 30), which included the following: Boise 
student housing (which corresponded to one of the ads for a r o o m t e ) ,  the definition of 
sexual assault, the average sentence for rape, rapist, details of rape, as well as numerous 
other searches related to rape, rape statistics, and air guns. (TR Vol. 1, p. 403, L.4 to p. 
407, L.5) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
UNDER THE SUPREME COURT'S GANT DECISION, 
WAS THE SEARCH INCIDENT TO A W S T  IN THIS 
CASE UNCONSTITUTIONAL; SHOULD THE 
EVIDENTIARY FRUITS OF THAT SEARCH HAVE 
BEEN SUPPRESSED; AND WAS THE 
INTRODUCTION OF THAT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL 
PREJUDICIAL? 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER THE SUPREME COURT'S GANT DECISION, THE SEARCH 
INCIDENT TO ARREST IN THIS CASE WAS ILLEGAL; ITS FRUITS 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED; AND THE ADMISSION OF THE 
TAINTED EVIDENCE WAS NOT HARMLESS 
A. Procedural History 
Newman filed a motion to suppress challenging the warrantless search of his 
vehicle immediately following his arrest for a municipal code violation on July 27, 2007. 
In that motion he made two arguments. First, he argued the arrest violated his federal due 
process sights because it was predicated on a vague statute that provided inadequate 
notice of the conduct prohibited by the Boise ordinance prohibiting entry into the park 
after hours. As such, the fruits of the unlawful arrest should have been suppressed. 
Second, Newman argued that in light of the nature of the offense for which he had 
been arrested - being in a park after hours - the search incident to that arrest was not 
conducted to protect the officers or reveal evidence of the municipal code violation, and 
thus the warrantfess search was not a valid search incident to arrest. In his reply brief, 
Newman directed the District Court's attention to the case of State v. Gant, an Arizona 
case as to which the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari to revisit the 
question whether police may indiscriminately search a vehicle following the arrest and 
detention of the driver. 
The District Court denied Newman's motion. It rejected the argument that the 
Boise ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, a ruling Newman does not challenge in this 
appeal. It also held that under existing Supreme Court precedent, the search incident to 
Newman's arrest was valid. (R p. 66) As will appear, that ruling was reversible error. 
B. Under the Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Arizona v. Gant, 
the Search Incident To Arrest in this Case Unquestionably 
Violated the Fourth Amendment 
An officer's warrantless entry of a vehicle to search it or to seize items within is 
presumed to violate the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches 
unless the state demonstrates it fell within one of the narrowly drawn exceptions to the 
warrant requirement. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219 (1973); State v. 
Gomez, 144 Idaho 865, 870,'172 P.3d 1140, 1145 (Ct.App. 2007). When a warrantless 
search has been challenged, it is the state's burden to prove the applicability of such an 
exception. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,455 (1971); State v. Brauch, 133 
Idaho 215,218-19,984 P.2d 703,706-07 (1999). If the government fails to meet its 
burden, the evidence obtained as a result of the search, including evidence later 
discovered and seized by exploitation of the original illegal search, is inadmissible at trial. 
Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984); Brauch, 133 Idaho at 219,984 P.2d at 
The search of Newman's car was concededly,warrantless. The sole theory offered 
by the prosecution below to justify the search, and the only one relied on by the District 
Court in its order denying suppression, was the search incident to arrest exception to the 
warrant requirement. But in light of Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009), the very case 
to which Newman referred in his suppression briefing, there can now be little doubt that 
the search incident to arrest in this case was invalid and thus that the District Court erred 
. when it denied Newman's suppression motion. 
Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license, handcuffed, and secured in 
the back of a police car. Id. at 1714. Conducting a search incident to the arrest, police 
found cocaine in the pocket of a jacket on the back seat of Gant's vehicle. Id. The 
Arizona Supreme Court held that the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the Fourth 
Amendment's warrant requirement, as defined in Chime1 v. Cal~ornia, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969), and applied to vehicle searches in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, did not 
justify the search. 
In reviewing the Arizona decision on certiorari, the United States Supreme Court 
began with core principles: 
Consistent with our precedent, our analysis begins, as it 
should in every case addressing the reasonableness of a 
warrantless search, with the basic rule that "searches 
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval 
by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions."Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347,357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 
(1967) (footnote omitted). Among the exceptions to the 
warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. See 
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341,58 
L.Ed. 652 (1914). The exception derives from interests in 
officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically 
implicated in arrest situations. See United States v. Robinson, 
414 U.S. 218,230-234,94 S.Ct. 467,38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); 
Chimel, 395 U.S., at 763,89 S.Ct. 2034. 
Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1716. 
The Court then criticized the extremely expansive reading often given Belton: 
Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search would be 
authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant 
notwithstanding that in most cases the vehicle's passenger 
compartment will not be within the arrestee's reach at the time 
of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search 
incident to every recent occupant's arrest would thus untether 
the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel 
exception-a result clearly incompatible with our statement in 
Belton that it "in no way alters the fundamental principles 
established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of 
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests."453 U.S., at 460, 
n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2860.Accordingly, we reject this reading of 
Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to 
search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only 
when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance 
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. 
Gant made clear that the contention that containers within a vehicle can be 
subjected to warrantless searches is founded on the incorrect assumption that an arrested 
occupant of that vehicle does not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy as to such 
containers: 
[Tlhe State seriously undervalues the privacy interests at 
stake. Although we have recognized that a motorist's privacy 
interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home, see 
New Yorkv. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-113, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 
L.Ed.2d 81 (1986), the former interest is nevertheless 
important and deserving of constitutional protection, see 
Knowles, 525 U.S., at 117, 119 S.Ct. 484.It is particularly 
significant that Belton searches authorize police officers to 
search not just the passenger compartment but every purse, 
briefcase, or other container within that space. A rule that 
gives police the power to conduct such a search whenever an 
individual is caught committing a traffic offense, when there 
is no basis for believing evidence of the offense might be 
found in the vehicle, creates a serious and recurring threat to 
the privacy of countless individuals. 
Id., at 1720. 
The Gant Court concluded: 
Police may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's 
arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is 
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the 
oflease of arrest. When these justifications are absent, a 
search of an arrestee's vehiclewill be unreasonable unless 
police obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the 
warrant requirement applies. The Arizona Supreme Court 
correctly held that this case involved an unreasonable search. 
Id. at 1723 (emphasis added). 
Arizona v. Gant was decided in 2009, after both the ruling on appellant's 
suppression motion and his trial and conviction. Nonetheless, it fully applies to any 
criminal conviction still on direct appeal at the time of the Supreme Court decision. See 
Grfjth v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314,328 (1987) ("a new rule for the conduct of criminal 
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct 
review or not yet final . . . .") 
For example, following Gant, the United States Supreme Court ordered the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider its decision in United Stales v. 
Gonzalez, 290 Fed. Appx. 51 (9" Cir. Aug. 7,2008) (hereafter Gonzalez 0. In Gonzalez I, 
the defendant was in a vehicle driven by another party when the vehicle was stopped and 
the driver arrested for outstanding warrants. Gonzalez was handcuffed and secured in a 
police car when the police searched the vehicle and found a firearm in the glove 
compartment. Having been charged and convicted of a firearm violation for possessing 
the firearm, Gonzalez brought a motion to suppress on the ground that the search of the 
vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights; the motion was denied by the district 
court. 
In Gonzalez I,  , the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed the denial of the suppression 
motion. Following the post-Gant remand, however, the Circuit reversed itself and ordered 
suppression of the evidence of the firearm obtained in the vehicle search. United States v. 
Gonzalez, 2009 WL 2581738 (9" Cir. 2009) (Gonzalez IT). Gonzalez 11 explained that the 
Circuit had rested its first decision "on the Supreme Court's holding in New York v. 
Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981), which has been read by our court as permitting a 
warrantless vehicle search incident to the arrest of an occupant of the vehicle." 2009 WL 
2581738 "1. The Gonzalez 11 panel then stated: "In Gant, the Court affirmed the Arizona 
Supreme Court's holding that the broad reading of Belton by our and other courts was 
error." Id. The Ninth Circuit continued: 
Reading Belton more narrowly, the Court announced as the 
rule for vehicle searches incident to arrest: "police may search 
a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the 
arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to 
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. 
When these justifications are absent, a search of an arsestee's 
vehicle will be unreasonable unless police obtain a warrant or 
show that another exception to the warrant requirement 
applies. 
Id. (quoting Gant, 129 S.Ct. at 1723-24) 
The Circuit went on to reject the government's argument that the search could be 
upheld as made "in good faith under the then-prevailing interpretation of Belton and that, 
therefore, the exclusionary rule should not be applied." Id. 
The Government relies on the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695 (2009), 
which applied the good faith exception of United States v. 
Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), in holding that whether the 
exclusionary rule should be applied to a search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment turns on the culpability of the police 
and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police 
conduct. Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698. Neither the Supreme 
Court nor our court, however, has applied the good faith 
exception to the scenario we face: a search conducted under a 
then-prevailing interpretation of a Supreme Court ruling, but 
rendered unconstitutional by a subsequent Supreme Court ml- 
ing announced while the defendant's conviction was on direct 
review. The cases the Government relies on involve applica- 
tion of the good faith exception to searches conducted in reli- 
ance on a warrant held invalid following the search; see, e.g., 
Herring 129 S. Ct. at 698; or a statute or regulation 
subsequently found unconstitutional during direct review of 
the defendant's conviction; see, e.g., Illinois v. Krull, 480 
U.S. 340 (1987); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 
(1975); United States v. Meek, 366 F.3d 705 (9th Cir. 2004). 
We conclude, however, that this case should be controlled by 
long-standing precedent governing the applicability of a new 
rule announced by the Supreme Court while a case is on direct 
review. The Court has held that a decision of this Court 
construing the Fourth Amendment is to be applied 
retroactively to all convictions that were not yet final at the 
time the decision was rendered. United States v. Johnson, 457 
U.S. 537,562 (1982); see Grifith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 
328 (1987) (finding that even decisions constituting a "clear 
break" with past precedent have retroactive application). This 
precedent requires us to apply Gant to the current case 
without the overlay of an application of the good faith 
exception. To hold that Gant may not be fully applied here, as 
the Government urges, would conflict with the Court's 
retroactivity precedents. 
Such a ruling would undermine the rationale of Johnson and 
Grzfith. As stated in Grifith, "failure to apply a newly 
declared constitutional rule to criminal cases pending on 
direct review violates basic norms of constitutional adjudica- 
tion." 479 U.S. at 314. It would violate "the integrity of judi- 
cial review" by turning the court into, in effect, a legislative 
body announcing new rules but not applying them, rather than 
acting in our proper role as an adjudicative body deciding 
cases. It also would "violate[ ] the principle of treating simi- 
larly situated defendants the same" by allowing only one 
defendant to be the beneficiary of a newly announced rule. Id. 
at 322-23. 
Id., at *2. 
Gonzalez I1 noted that the Supreme Court had not relied on a good-faith exception 
in Gant itself, a post-Herring case. 
In Gant, the Supreme Court upheld in full the decision of the 
Arizona Supreme Court, which not only found the search at 
issue unconstitutional, but ordered the suppression of the 
evidence found as a result of the unconstitutional search. See 
Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1724; State v. Gant, 162 P.3d 640,646 
(Ariz. 2007). Hence, refusal to allow Gonzalez similarly to 
benefit from the Court's ruling in Gant through application of 
the exclusionary rule would implicate the same concerns 
mandating the Court's holding in Grijjjth. 
Because both Johnson and Grzfith remain binding precedent, 
we cannot apply the good faith exception here without 
creating an untenable tension within existing Supreme Court 
law. We, therefore, hold that evidence derived from the search 
at issue must be suppressed and reverse Gonzalez's 
conviction. 
Id. at *2. 
Of equal importance, under its state constitution, Idaho has rejected the claim that 
the fruits of a search conducted in violation of the Fourth Amendment can be admitted on 
the ground that the search, while unconstitutional, was conducted in good faith. State v. 
Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992) (This Court rejects rule that fruits of search 
conducted on basis of invalid warrant can be admitted at trial because officers relied in 
good faith on validity of defective warrant); Idaho Constitution, art. 1, 3 17. 
The Guzman court said this: "In sum, we finally and unequivocally no longer 
adhere to a policy of sheepishly following in the footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
the area of state constitutional analysis. Based on our independent analysis of the merits 
of the good faith exception, as viewed in light of long-standing provisions of our Idaho 
Constitution, we are convinced that it is ill-conceived and cannot be reconciled with art. 
I ,  3 17 of our state constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that the citizenry of Idaho will 
be better served if it no longer controls. We so hold." 122 Idaho at 998,842 P.2d at 677. 
Given that this Court has rejected a good faith exception in the context of a search 
conducted pursuant to a defective warrant, a fortiori such an exception cannot be 
recognized in the context of a warrantless search and seizure. Thus, irrespective of 
whether federal courts other than the Ninth Circuit hold that a Leon-Herring good faith 
rule pennits admission of evidence unconstitutionally seized prior to Gant during vehicle 
searches conducted incident to arrest, under Idaho law the fruits of such an illegal search 
incident to arrest must be suppressed. 
C. The Search Herein At Issue Was Violative of the Fourth Amendment 
As Applied in Gant 
The search of Newman's car was concededly warrantless. The sole theory offered 
by the prosecution below to justify the search, and the only one relied on by the District 
Court in its order denying suppression, was that of the search incident to arrest exception 
to the warrant requirement. But in light of Gant, the very same cause of action cited by 
Newman in his suppression briefing in the trial court, there can no doubt that the search 
incident in this case was unconstitutional and thus that the District Court erred when it 
denied Newman's suppression motion. 
This Court freely reviews the trial court's determination whether, on the facts 
found, constitutional standards were violated. State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,658, 152 
P.3d 16, 19 (2007). The bright line rule of Gant requires suppression in this case. As 
Officer Bammert testified both during the suppression proceedings and at trial, when he 
ordered Newman out of the vehicle, Newman was under arrest for the sole offense of 
remaining in the park after hours. Newman left the car without resisting and the officers 
handcuffed him and placed him on the sidewalk away from the SUV. 
Under Gant, at that point the officers had no right to enter the car without a 
warrant. Newman was handcuffed and secured and outside reaching distance of the car. 
The elements of the municipal violation for which he had been arrested - physical 
presence in the park after a given hour - were not subject to disputc4 It is impossible to 
reasonably assert that the searching officers were seeking, or could possibly have 
obtained, evidence in appellant's vehicle relevant to the crime for which Newman had 
been arrested. For example, it would be patently ridiculous to suggest that Newman's 
computer was seized as evidence relevant to the after hours charge. Thus, the warrantless 
search constituted a violation of Newman's Fourth Amendment rights, requiring 
suppression of its f r ~ i t s . ~  
Specifically, Newman was arrested for violating Boise Municipal Code 3 13-03- 
05 E which states: "No person shall enter or remain in the park during hours of closure, 
except for purposes of transit through the park, or as authorized by permit." Section 13- 
03-08 sets for the relevant hours of operation of the city's parks as "every day of the year 
from sunrise to sunset." 
Having seized Newman's laptop as part of the illegal search incident to arrest, the 
police eventually got a warrant to search it. (TR Vol. June 18,2008, p. 31, L. 1 et seq.) 
Indisputably the legality of the warrant depended entirely on the validity of the original 
search. The search was illegal under Gant, so its fruits, including the eventual search of 
D. Reversal Is Required 
Reversal due to the admission of evidence seized in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment requires reversal unless the state demonstrates "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
that the error did not contribute to the verdict. Chapman v. California 386 U.S. 18,24 
(1967). It simply cannot be reasonably argued that the error in admitting the illegally 
seized evidence was harmless. Without the laptop, Newman could never have been 
charged with an attempted sexual assault. 
Certainly the prosecution believed the evidence on the laptop was key to its case. 
Following a motion by Newman to exclude much of the evidence on the laptop, the state 
fought mightily to keep that evidence in the case; indeed, at the pretrial hearing under 
I.R.E. 404(b) on the admissibility of the computer evidence, the state asserted that "the 
only way we know his crime plan is by admitting this evidence." (TR Vol. July 2,2008 p. 
118, L. 2-4). The prosecution's closing arguments rested almost wholly on the evidence 
which should have been suppressed. In both her opening argument and rebuttal, the 
prosecutor relied heavily on items that were seized as part of the search incident to arrest. 
(See, e.g., TR Vol. 1 ,  p. 638, L. 11, 19; p. 644, L. 21; p. 646, L. 16). And she spent the 
bulk of both her opening and rebuttal arguments stressing the contents of Newman's 
laptop computer: e-mails, videos, Google searches, and so forth. (See, e.g., TR Vol. 1, p. 
640, L. 5; p. 641, L. 13; p. 642, L. 25; p. 642, L. 15; p. 643, L. 22; p. 645. L. 20; p. 645, 
the computer, was illegal as well. Wbng Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) 
22 
L. 25; p. 646, L. 1; p, 647, L. 7; p. 647, L. 25; p. 648, L. 1-25; p. 649, L. 1-25; p. 677, L. 
16; p. 678, L. 1-25) 
Because appellant's conviction resulted almost exclusively from evidence derived 
from the unconstitutional search of appellant's vehicle, the erroneous admission at trial of 
the illegally seized evidence cannot possibly be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The Court must vacate the judgment of conviction and remand for further 
proceedings. See State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,203 P.3d 1203 (Sup.Ct. 2009)(court 
vacates conviction and remands for further proceedings after reversing District Court's 
denial of suppression motion) State v. LaMay, 140 Idaho 835, 103 P.3d 448 (Sup.Ct. 
2004)(same); State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778,963 P.2d 1215 (Ct.App. 1998)(same). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should reverse appellant Newman's conviction 
and remand for further 
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